Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences
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Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Economic Management and Green Development
Series Vol. 43 , 10 November 2023
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Assessment of Salient Problems Associated with the Separation of Ownership and Control of Modern Cor-porations: Evaluation of Solutions and Their Effectiveness
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Abstract
This paper examines the salient problems related to the separation of ownership and control of modern corporations, as discussed in the books ‘The Wealth of Nations’ and ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property’. It qualitatively analyzes past empirical studies and evaluates the effectiveness of various solutions aimed at alleviating the separation between ownership and control. The analysis reveals that the agency relationship between shareholders and organizational managers underpins the phenomenon of ownership and control separation in modern companies. This separation offers several benefits, including ensuring business sustainability through professional management, efficient decision-making, and maximizing physical capital. Additionally, numerous mechanisms have proven effective in managing these issues. The paper explores management ownership and incentives, independent ownership, and institutional ownership as solutions that they have been found to reduce institutional problems and manage risk avoidance.
Keywords
separation, cause of separation, salient problem, empirical finding, effectiveness analysis
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- Volume Title
- Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Economic Management and Green Development
- ISBN (Print)
- 978-1-83558-107-0
- ISBN (Online)
- 978-1-83558-108-7
- Published Date
- 10 November 2023
- Series
- Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences
- ISSN (Print)
- 2754-1169
- ISSN (Online)
- 2754-1177
- DOI
- 10.54254/2754-1169/43/20232149
- Copyright
- 10 November 2023
- Open Access
- This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited