Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences

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Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Economic Management and Green Development

Series Vol. 30 , 10 November 2023


Open Access | Article

Analysis of the Game Behavior of Real Estate Mortgage Securities Issuers Based on Reciprocal Preferences

Tian Tan * 1
1 The University of Sheffield

* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.

Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences, Vol. 30, 135-143
Published 10 November 2023. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by EWA Publishing
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Citation Tian Tan. Analysis of the Game Behavior of Real Estate Mortgage Securities Issuers Based on Reciprocal Preferences. AEMPS (2023) Vol. 30: 135-143. DOI: 10.54254/2754-1169/30/20231458.

Abstract

In recent years, the Chinese government has gradually begun to pay attention to the development of real estate investment trusts (REITs) and hopes to use REITs to increase the securitization of assets in the real estate market, making it possible to accelerate the circulation of funds in the real estate market. In order to enable issuers to price REITs effectively to form a mutually beneficial transaction model with investors, to increase the willingness and success rate of both parties and to ultimately create a harmonious and efficient REITs market, it is important to study the pricing decisions of issuers when issuing REITs. This study analyzes and investigates the issue of pricing decisions of REITs based on reciprocal preferences and evolutionary game theory. It is found that when the proportion of REITs issuers choosing to construct a reciprocal initial pricing decision is greater than the equilibrium probability of REITs issuers choosing a reciprocal pricing strategy, and when the initial proportion of investors choosing a reciprocal investment decision is greater than the equilibrium probability of investors choosing a reciprocal investment strategy, the overall REITs transaction market tends to be a reciprocal and harmonious transaction market at this time, the overall happiness of the REITs trading market is the highest, and the success rate of trading increases and the capital circulation of the real estate market is accelerated. Therefore, it is recommended that issuers choose reciprocal competitive decisions when pricing REITs in order to increase the success rate of their own REIT holdings; and it is recommended that the government, when regulating the pricing of REITs, pays attention to the psychological factors of reciprocal preferences of issuers and investors and that the government penalizes REIT issuers and investors when they choose self-serving decisions and rewards them when they choose reciprocal decisions.

Keywords

real estate investment trusts (REITs), behavioral economics, evolutionary game theory, reciprocity preference, issue pricing

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Data Availability

The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study will be available from the authors upon reasonable request.

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Volume Title
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Economic Management and Green Development
ISBN (Print)
978-1-83558-081-3
ISBN (Online)
978-1-83558-082-0
Published Date
10 November 2023
Series
Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences
ISSN (Print)
2754-1169
ISSN (Online)
2754-1177
DOI
10.54254/2754-1169/30/20231458
Copyright
© 2023 The Author(s)
Open Access
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited

Copyright © 2023 EWA Publishing. Unless Otherwise Stated