Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences
- The Open Access Proceedings Series for Conferences
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Financial Technology and Business Analysis
Series Vol. 69 , 08 January 2024
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The Difficulties and Optimization of Marriage Matching: An Analysis in the Context of China’s Modern Economy
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Abstract
This study delves into the use of matching theory in addressing the stable marriage problem, examining ways to optimize overall utility for both women and men across all stable matchings. The paper introduce the concept of energy, denoted by the ranking where a lower rank signifies higher priority, as a metric for individual satisfaction in a match. The primary objective is to identify a stable match that reduces the average energy expended by both genders. By emphasizing average energy, this study aims to pinpoint a stable match that optimally minimizes this metric. A variety of optimization algorithms and mathematical models are utilized to navigate the solution space and determine the best match. A comprehensive analysis of stable matchings, alongside their associated energies for men and women, unveils the inherent trade-offs and dilemmas stemming from individual preferences. The essence of stability is also explored, underscoring the imperative of balancing individual contentment with the durability of the match. The paper concludes by accentuating the necessity for continued research to bolster overall utility in stable matchings, encompassing the investigation of supplementary constraints and preferences.
Keywords
Marriage matching, deferred acceptance algorithm, average energy
References
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Data Availability
The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study will be available from the authors upon reasonable request.
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- Volume Title
- Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Financial Technology and Business Analysis
- ISBN (Print)
- 978-1-83558-269-5
- ISBN (Online)
- 978-1-83558-270-1
- Published Date
- 08 January 2024
- Series
- Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences
- ISSN (Print)
- 2754-1169
- ISSN (Online)
- 2754-1177
- DOI
- 10.54254/2754-1169/69/20231206
- Copyright
- 08 January 2024
- Open Access
- This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited